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Abstract
Experience shows that most researchers and developers tend to
treat plain-domains (those that are not prefixed with “www” sub-
domains, e.g. “example.com”) as synonyms for their equivalent
www-domains (those that are prefixed with “www” sub-domains,
e.g. “www.example.com”). In this paper, we analyse datasets of
nearly two million plain-domains against their equivalent www-
domains to answer the following question: Do plain-domains and
their equivalent www-domains differ in TLS security configurations
and certificates? If so, to what extent? Our results provide evi-
dence of an interesting phenomenon: plain-domains and their
equivalent www-domains differ in TLS security configurations
and certificates in a non-trivial number of cases. Furthermore,
www-domains tend to have stronger security configurations than
their equivalent plain-domains. Interestingly, this phenomenon is
more prevalent in the most-visited domains than in randomly-
chosen domains. Further analysis of the top domains dataset
shows that 53.35% of the plain-domains that show one or more
weakness indicators (e.g. expired certificate) that are not shown in
their equivalent www-domains perform HTTPS redirection from
HTTPS plain-domains to their equivalent HTTPS www-domains.
Additionally, 24.71% of these redirections contains plain-text
HTTP intermediate URLs. In these cases, users see the final
www-domains with strong TLS configurations and certificates,
but in fact, the HTTPS request has passed through plain-domains
that have less secure TLS configurations and certificates. Clearly,
such a set-up introduces a weak link in the security of the overall
interaction.
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1 Introduction
The “www.” (world-wide web) prefix has become a de facto
standard for domains running websites. Plain-domains (those
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without the “www.” prefix, e.g. “example.com”) are usually treated
as synonyms for their equivalent www-domains (those that are
prefixed with “www.”, e.g. “www.example.com”).
As a concrete example, from an application development per-
spective, recently, in August 2018, Google’s Chrome1 version
69.0.3497.81 decided to hide the “www” and “m” (“m” for mo-
bile) sub-domains from the steady-state URL in Chrome’s address
bar by default [20]. Google describes these sub-domains as “triv-
ial” in Chrome’s custom settings, where users can enable display-
ing these sub-domains through the following URI: “chrome://flags/
#omnibox-ui-hide-steady-state-url-scheme-and-sub-domains”. This
change by Google has received criticism and media attention
from the security community, as shown in [20][25][7]. One of
the reasons for not welcoming this change is that it can cause
confusion [20]. For example, two addresses, one with a “www”
sub-domain and another without a “www” sub-domain can point
to completely different websites [20]. One user reported Chrome’s
new behaviour of hiding the “www” and “m” sub-domains as
a bug [15]. In the same report [15], another user has pointed
out that the Safari mobile browser also hides the “www” sub-
domains from its address bar [15]. Subsequently, other users
have reported that the Google search engine sometimes hides
the “www” sub-domains in search results and uses plain-domains
format [1]. However, we are unable to reproduce the issue (bug)
reported in [15] regarding Chrome’s new behaviour since Chrome
does not provide an archive for old versions. Nevertheless, the re-
ported bug includes several confirming responses [15], in addition
to media reports, such as [20][25][7], which provide sufficient
evidence that the issue has existed in that particular version,
either in the desktop, or the mobile version, or both. Our test
of Chrome’s latest version shows that subsequent versions (as
of March 2019, version 73.0.3683.86) have reverted this change
from a default to a custom setting.
From a research perspective, in particular, on Internet mea-
surement studies which are concerned with examining domains’
TLS security configurations and certificates, we observe differ-
ent treatments for the examined domain names. A considerable
number of these studies make use of the Alexa top domains
list [4]. Alexa represents domains as plain-domains, except for a
small percentage2 of domains that include sub-domains including
“www” sub-domains. Some studies, such as [18], add the “www”
sub-domains to the examined domains, and report the results
based on TLS handshakes with www-domains. Other studies,
1As a shorthand, we use the term Chrome for the rest of the paper to refer to Google’s
Chrome.
2This percentage is around 4.99% in our Alexa dataset.
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such as [14], first try to establish a TLS handshake with the ex-
amined domain “as is”, and if the handshake with the domain “as
is” has failed, they make a second handshake with the domain’s
equivalent www-domain, and report the results. The third line of
Internet measurement studies such as [11][12], do not mention
adding any “www” sub-domains to the examined domains, hence,
we assume that they treat the list’s domains (e.g. the Alexa list
in these studies) “as is”. However, it remains unclear whether
plain-domains differ from their equivalent www-domains in terms
of TLS configurations and certificates? If one type of domains,
e.g. www-domains, provides better TLS security configurations
than their equivalent plain-domains, or vice versa, to what extent
does taking one approach over another affect the overall results?
In particular, regarding the domains’ adoption of TLS security
configurations, e.g. protocol versions, or the domains’ certificates
status results.
In this paper, we try to answer the following question: Do plain-
domains and their equivalent www-domains differ in TLS security
configurations and certificates? If so, to what extent?
2 Background
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [24][23], formerly
known as Secure Socket Layer (SSL), is one of the most im-
portant and widely used security protocols to date. The latest
version of TLS is known as TLS 1.3 [24]. We refer to versions
prior to TLS 1.3 (in particular, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.0)
as pre-TLS 1.3. TLS operates below application layer protocols,
to provide data confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. TLS
consists of multiple sub-protocols, including the handshake pro-
tocol. In the handshake protocol, both communicating parties
authenticate each other, and negotiate security-sensitive param-
eters, including the protocol version and the ciphersuite, that
will be used to secure subsequent messages of the protocol.
The ciphersuite is an identifier, represented by a string or a
hexadecimal value, which defines the cryptographic algorithms
(e.g. symmetric encryption algorithm) and their parameters (e.g.
key length) that will be used in subsequent messages of the
protocol. In pre-TLS 1.3 versions, the ciphersuite defines the
key-exchange, authentication, symmetric encryption, and hash
algorithms. However, in TLS 1.3, the key-exchange is separated
from the ciphersuites, and it is now negotiated in specific exten-
sions.
The version and ciphersuite choices are intrinsic in determin-
ing the security guarantees that the protocol can provide in a
particular session. Some ciphersuites provide stronger security
guarantees than others. For example, Forward Secrecy (FS) guar-
antees that a compromise in a server’s long-term private-key does
not compromise past session keys [19]. Similarly, Authenticated
Encryption (AE) provides confidentiality, integrity, and authen-
ticity, simultaneously, which provides stronger resilience against
attacks over the MAC-then-encrypt schemes [26][5]. The same
applies to the protocol version. Each version of the protocol
prevents attacks discovered in previous versions, and provides
more security guarantees. For example, TLS 1.3 enforces FS
key-exchange algorithms and AE ciphersuites (FS+AE) by design.
TLS 1.2 supports AE in addition to FS but both are optional,
while TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.0 do not support AE ciphersuites.
Client (C) Server (S)
CH(v−maxC ,[a1, ...,an],...,[e1, ...,v1, ...,vn
+, ...,en])
SH(vS,aS, ...)
The rest of the handshake
Figure 1: Illustration of the TLS version and ciphersuite negotiation.
Parameters followed by “−” are deprecated in TLS 1.3 but still included
for backward compatibility, while those followed by “+” are newly in-
troduced in TLS 1.3. The unmarked parameters are mutual to both
versions.
As depicted in Figure 1, at the beginning of a new TLS hand-
shake, the client sends a ClientHello (CH) message to the server.
The CH contains several security-sensitive parameters, including:
first, the client’s supported versions. In pre-TLS 1.3, this parame-
ter is sent as a single value vmaxC . In TLS 1.3, it is sent as a list
[v1, ...,vn] in the “supported_versions” extension. The vmaxC is
still included in TLS 1.3 CH for backward compatibility, and its
value is set to TLS 1.2. Second, the client’s supported ciphersuites
is sent as a list [a1, ...,an]. Third, the client’s supported exten-
sions as a list [e1, ...,en] at the end of the message. In TLS 1.3,
the extensions must at least include the “supported_versions”,
while in TLS 1.2, the extensions are optional. Upon receiving
the CH, the server selects a single mutually supported version
vS and ciphersuite aS from the client’s offer. The server then
responds with a ServerHello (SH) containing vS and aS. The
server’s selection of vS and aS is imposed on the client. That is,
the server’s decision on the version and ciphersuite is the final
one. If the server does not support the client’s offered versions or
ciphersuites, the server responds with a handshake failure alert.
3 Dataset
Our study includes two datasets: top-domains, which contains
829,873 distinct most-visited domains globally, and random-
domains, which contains 992,422 distinct random domains. We
now define some of the terms that we use throughout the paper:
(1) Main-domains: domains consisting of a Top Level Domain
(TLD) (e.g. “com”) prefixed by a single label, and do not have
any further sub-domains, e.g. “example.com”. (2) Plain-domains:
domains that are not prefixed with “www” sub-domains, e.g. “ex-
ample.com”. (3) www-domains: domains that are prefixed with
“www” sub-domains, e.g. “www.example.com”. Our scope is lim-
ited to general TLDs (gTLDs), i.e. single-level TLDs, such as
“com”, and does not include multi-level TLDs, such as country-
code TLDs (ccTLDs), for example “ac.uk”. This is to avoid the
complexity of distinguishing domains that have sub-domains from
domains that have ccTLDs which is somewhat difficult to achieve
with 100% accuracy. In what follows we describe how we build
and pre-process each dataset.
3.1 Top-Domains
The top-domains dataset is derived from the Alexa list of the
top one million most-visited domains globally [4], retrieved on
December 11, 2018. Since our study targets plain-domains initially,
from the 1 million domains, we extract the domains that are
classified as plain-domains and also classified as main-domain
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(see the previous paragraph for our definitions of plain-domains
and main-domains). We end up with 829,873 distinct top domains.
To create their equivalent www-domains, we make a replica of
the extracted plain-domains, then we prefix each domain with
“www.”.
3.2 Random-Domains
Our random-domains dataset initial size is one million domains,
extracted from a large dataset of 54,063,220 domains that have
successfully completed TLS handshakes in Amann et al. [6]. The
domains in [6] are collected from multiple sources including other
lists and previous work. We pre-process our random-domains
dataset in two steps: First, to maintain consistency with the
top-domains dataset format, from Amann et al.’s list [6], we
extract one million random domains that are classified as main-
domains and plain-domains. Second, from the just extracted
domains, we exclude the domains that already exist in the top-
domains dataset, to avoid repetition. We finish with 992,422
distinct random domains. Finally, to create their equivalent www-
domains, we create a replica of the dataset, then we prefix each
domain with “www.”.
4 Methodology
4.1 Data Collection
To collect data, we run a TLS client that takes the domain names
from our datasets as input, performs a TLS handshake with each
domain, and outputs the handshake’s response data. For each
dataset, namely the top-domains and random-domains datasets,
the client performs TLS handshakes with plain-domains and their
equivalent www-domains concurrently, using two separate TLS
client instances. We perform two types of TLS handshakes per do-
main: one utilising TLS 1.2 client configurations, and the second
utilising TLS 1.3 client configurations. Our clients’ configurations
(mainly, the supported TLS versions and ciphersuites) are based
on Chrome’s latest version configurations. We choose to base our
clients’ TLS configurations on Chrome because it is the most
representative TLS client on the Internet today. As of February
2019, Chrome’s usage is 79.7% [27]. To increase our confidence
in the obtained results, we run the above-described experiment
twice. The first experiment run from the 11th to 12th December
2018, and the second one run from the 5th to 6th March 2019.
The TLS handshakes’ responses, which include the servers’
TLS versions, ciphersuites, and certificates are first stored in json
format, parsed, then stored and analysed using the MySQL database
and queries. In terms of counting the servers’ responses, we
follow a best-effort approach. That is, we count the responding
domains but we do not investigate the reasons for the non-
responding ones. However, we eliminate the possibility of servers’
rate-limit3 as a reason for the non-responding domains, as our
client performs only two handshakes (TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3)
per domain type (plain-domains and www-domains) per dataset
(top-domains and random-domains). We also eliminate the time
gap4 as a reason for the non-responding domains, as our clients’
3Rate-limit is a technique used to mitigate Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by specifying
a threshold for the incoming requests by a particular source address.
4By time gap we refer to a situation where a domain can be alive in one handshake (e.g.
with plain-domain), but goes down in the second handshake (e.g. with www-domain).
handshakes with both plain-domains and their equivalent www-
domains are performed concurrently. In our analysis, we only
consider the domains that responded to both plain-domains and
their equivalent www-domains handshakes.
In terms of the TLS client that performs the TLS handshakes,
our TLS client is based on tls-scan [29], an open source fast
TLS scanner capable of performing concurrent TLS connections.
We then customise the tls-scan to utilise the OpenSSL 1.1.0g
TLS library for our TLS 1.2 client and the OpenSSL 1.1.1a
for our TLS 1.3 client. We customise our clients’ offered TLS
versions and ciphersuites to be equivalent to those offered by
Chrome’s latest version for our TLS 1.3 client, and Chrome’s
latest version pre-TLS 1.3 configurations for our TLS 1.2 client.
The Server Name Indication (SNI)5 extension is included by
default. We set the concurrency argument to 50 and 25 concurrent
connections (these vary between the first and second experiment),
and the timeout argument is set to 5 seconds. We run the
experiments at the University of Oxford, on computers equipped
with 1000 Mbps wired Ethernet cards.
After the TLS scan is complete, to better understand the
results, we conduct an HTTPS redirection scan. We build a multi-
threaded redirection scanner based on the Python’s Requests
library [22], which provides HTTPS redirection data. The scanner
takes as input the domains that have provided responses from both
plain-domains and their equivalent www-domains in the TLS 1.3
handshakes in the second TLS scan experiment. The scanner then
performs an HTTPS request with each domain without certificate
validation, and collects the HTTPS redirection chain from the
initial until the final URL (or domain) for each request. We then
store and analyse the data using the MySQL database and queries.
The redirection scan run from the 15th to 17th March 2019 at the
University of Oxford. The short time span between the last TLS
scan experiment and the redirection scan (around 8 days) allows
us to correlate the redirection behaviour to the TLS configurations
and certificate behaviour with confidence.
4.2 Ethical Considerations
First, we do not collect any private data. The data we collect are
public metadata. Second, we do not perform an exhaustive number
of handshakes on any single server. Our client’s handshakes can
by no means be classified as a Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
Third, we use a designated public IPv4 address for the scanning
device instead of Network Address Translation (NAT), to avoid
potential disturbance to other users in our organisation’s network,
if a server has blocked our scanning device’s IP. Fourth, we use
an informative DNS name for our scanning device that contains
“TLS probing”, to help server administrators identify our device’s
activity in their logs. Finally, we inform our University’s IT
and Security teams, so they expect a high volume of outgoing
connections from our experiment devices, and to expect some
incoming blacklisted certificates from random servers.
4.3 Data Analysis
To answer the first part of our research question (do plain-
domains and their equivalent www-domains differ in TLS security
5The SNI is a TLS extension that passes the domain name in the TLS handshake in
order to get more accurate responses in virtual hosting environments.
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configurations and certificates?), we count the number of domains
that: (a) responded to both plain-domains and their equivalent
www-domains TLS handshakes, and (b) provide different values
for one or more of the following TLS configurations: (1) TLS
versions, (2) Ciphersuites, (3) Versions and ciphersuites, (4) Ver-
sions or ciphersuites, (5) Leaf certificate Subject Key Identifiers
(SKI), which is an X509 extension that provides the means for
identifying certificates with a particular public-key [10], (6) Leaf
certificate fingerprints (SHA-1), which provide the means for iden-
tifying certificates in general (including all the certificate’s fields),
(7) IPv4, although not directly a TLS security configuration, but
we include it as a useful general result.
To answer the second part of our research question (If so, to
what extent?), we first define some weakness indicators denoted by
weak. Then, we analyse plain-domains and their equivalent www-
domains against weak. In what follows, we list these weakness
indicators, and define when they are satisfied by domains:
(1) v.<TLS 1.3: is satisfied by domains that select TLS ver-
sions less than TLS 1.3 (the latest version).
(2) v.<TLS 1.2: is satisfied by domains that select TLS ver-
sions less than TLS 1.2. Versions less than TLS 1.2 are
officially weak and should not be used today.
(3) non-FS: is satisfied by domains that select non-FS cipher-
suites (despite the AE or any other properties). We define
non-FS ciphersuites6 as those that do not support the
Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE), and are also not
negotiated with version TLS 1.3 since TLS 1.3 enforces
FS by design in a separate extension. Non-FS ciphersuites
provide fewer security guarantees than FS ciphersuites.
(4) non-FS+non-AE: is satisfied by domains that select non-
FS+non-AE ciphersuites, i.e. neither provide FS nor AE.
We define non-FS+non-AE ciphersuites as those that do not
support ECDHE, are not negotiated with version TLS 1.3,
do not support the ChaCha20 symmetric encryption, and
do not support the GCM symmetric encryption mode. This
indicator is not satisfied by domains that select FS+AE, i.e.
those that either support ECDHE or negotiated with version
TLS 1.3, and support either the ChaCha20 symmetric
cipher or the GCM mode. Non-FS+non-AE ciphersuites
provide fewer security guarantees than those that provide
both FS and AE (FS+AE).
(5) Exp. Certs.: is satisfied by domains that provide expired
certificates. The expiration check is performed by the tls-
scan client against the scan date [29].
(6) Invalid Certs.: is satisfied by domains that provide invalid
certificates. The certificate validation is performed by the
tls-scan client using the SSL_get_verify_result func-
tion in the OpenSSL library against our updated Ubuntu 18.04
certificates store. It validates the certificate’s signature, trust
chain, and other verification steps specified in [21].
(7) Key<2048: is satisfied by domains that use RSA certifi-
cates with a key length of less than 2048-bit. The minimum
recommended RSA key length today is 2048-bit7.
6All our definitions are based on Chrome’s configurations.
7https://www.keylength.com.
Table 1: Responding servers to our TLS clients’ handshakes.
Client Dataset Size Type Responses
TLS 1.2
top-domains 829,873
plain 691,200 (83.29%)
www 710,509 (85.62%)
random-domains 992,422
plain 623,869 (62.86%)
www 620,884 (62.56%)
TLS 1.3
top-domains 829,873
plain 691,145 (83.28%)
www 710,496 (85.62%)
random-domains 992,422
plain 622,904 (62.77%)
www 620,062 (62.48%)
Then, we count the domains’ responses under the follow-
ing conditions, where weak denotes a weakness indicator, plain
denotes plain-domains that have responses for their equivalent
www-domains, and www denotes www-domains that have re-
sponses for their equivalent plain-domains:
(1) weakplain: weak is satisfied by plain.
(2) weakplain∧¬weakwww: weak is satisfied by plain and weak
is not satisfied by www.
(3) weakwww: weak is satisfied by www.
(4) weakwww∧¬weakplain: weak is satisfied by www and weak
is not satisfied by plain.
5 Results
As described earlier in the methodology, we have conducted two
experiments over a 3-month time span, to increase our confidence
in the obtained results. In this section, we only report the results
from the latter experiment (March 2019). However, they are
consistent with the former experiment (December 2018).
5.1 Responding Servers
Table 1 summarises the number of successful TLS handshake
responses from plain-domains and their equivalent www-domains
in the top-domains and random-domains datasets, in both types
of client handshakes, TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. Responses from top
domains are higher than those from random domains. This is
mostly due to the fact that the TLS adoption rate in top domains
is higher than that in random domains. Furthermore, the top-
domains dataset is built from a recent Alexa list which contains
active domains, while the random-domains dataset is built from
a less recent list from Amann et al. [6], which may contain many
inactive domains. We notice that in the top-domains dataset,
www-domains responses are higher than plain-domains responses
by 2.3%. This means that top domains tend to have more active
www-domains than plain-domains. On the other hand, in the
random-domains dataset, both plain-domains and www-domains
responses are nearly equal, with slightly more responses from
plain-domains than www-domains.
5.2 The Difference is in the Detail
As depicted in Table 2, our results show that the client type, i.e.
TLS 1.2 vs. TLS 1.3, does not make a noticeable effect in terms
of the exhibited differences in TLS configurations and certificates
between plain-domains and their equivalent www-domains. How-
ever, in the “version” difference, TLS 1.3 client shows a higher
percentages (1.35% and 0.54%) than TLS 1.2 client (0.22% and
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Table 2: Differences between plain-domains and their equivalent www-domain against some TLS configurations. The “Responses” column represents
the number of domains that responded to both plain-domain and their equivalent www-domain TLS handshakes.
Different
Client Dataset Responses Version Ciphersuite
Version ∧
Ciphersuite
Version ∨
Ciphersuite SKI Cert. IPv4
TLS 1.2
top-domains 678,337 1472 (0.22%) 23,600 (3.48%) 1437 (0.21%) 23,635 (3.48%) 74,433 (10.97%) 75,359 (11.11%) 125,767 (18.54%)
random-domains 614,184 748 (0.12%) 7883 (1.28%) 737 (0.12%) 7894 (1.29%) 52,465 (8.54%) 52,844 (8.60%) 57,037 (9.29%)
TLS 1.3
top-domains 678,214 9187 (1.35%) 24,819 (3.66%) 9151 (1.35%) 24,855 (3.66%) 74,375 (10.97%) 75,311 (11.10%) 125,861 (18.56%)
random-domains 612,839 3292 (0.54%) 8386 (1.37%) 3282 (0.54%) 8396 (1.37%) 52,318 (8.54%) 52,718 (8.60%) 57,063 (9.31%)
Table 3: Breakdown of some weakness indicators weak in plain-domains and their equivalent www-domains based on the TLS 1.3 client handshake
responses. The indentation in the “Type/Condition” column indicates that the percentages of the indented row’s results are computed over the previous
row’s results. The percentages of the non-indented row’s results are computed over the “Responses” values. Recall: weak denotes weakness indicator;
weakplain denotes weak is satisfied by plain; weakplain ∧¬weakwww denotes weak is satisfied by plain and weak is not satisfied by www; weakwww denotes
weak is satisfied by www; and weakwww ∧¬weakplain denotes weak is satisfied by www and weak is not satisfied by plain.
Dataset Responses Type/Condition
Weakness Indicator (weak)
v.<TLS 1.3 v.<TLS 1.2 non-FS non-FS+non-AE Exp. Cert. Invalid Cert. Key<2048
top-domains 678,214
weakplain 542,267 (79.96%) 15,731 (2.32%) 27,777 (4.10%) 17,368 (2.56%) 24,521 (3.62%) 55,932 (8.25%) 6306 (0.93%)
weakplain∧¬weakwww 5280 (0.97%) 1179 (7.49%) 3151 (11.34%) 1907 (10.98%) 2510 (10.24%) 5281 (9.44%) 278 (4.41%)
weakwww 539,543 (79.55%) 14,846 (2.19%) 25,184 (3.71%) 15,710 (2.32%) 23,214 (3.42%) 52,773 (7.78%) 6116 (0.90%)
weakwww∧¬weakplain 2556 (0.47%) 294 (1.98%) 558 (2.22%) 302 (1.92%) 1203 (5.18%) 2122 (4.02%) 135 (2.21%)
random-domains 612,839
weakplain 545,924 (89.08%) 27,774 (4.53%) 38,653 (6.31%) 30,621 (5.00%) 55,734 (9.09%) 107,521 (17.54%) 18,781 (3.06%)
weakplain∧¬weakwww 1667 (0.31%) 536 (1.93%) 770 (1.99%) 496 (1.62%) 911 (1.63%) 1684 (1.57%) 191 (1.02%)
weakwww 545,171 (88.96%) 27,448 (4.48%) 38,152 (6.23%) 30,280 (4.94%) 55,350 (9.03%) 106,663 (17.40%) 18,628 (3.04%)
weakwww∧¬weakplain 914 (0.17)% 210 (0.77%) 269 (0.71%) 209 (0.69%) 527 (0.95%) 826 (0.77%) 46 (0.25%)
0.12%) in the top-domains and random-domains datasets, re-
spectively. This can be explained by the fact that TLS 1.3 was
standardised in 2018, which suggests that domain administrators
may have updated the TLS version of one domain, e.g. the
plain-domain, but not its equivalent, e.g. the www-domain, or
vice versa. In terms of other TLS configurations and certificate
differences at both clients TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2, in general,
top domains show higher percentages of differences in the TLS
configurations and certificates between plain-domains and their
equivalent www-domains than random domains. In general, the
most significant differences are in the leaf certificate fingerprints
(“Cert.”), certificate “SKI”, and in the selected “version or cipher-
suite”. For example, as illustrated in Table 2, in the top-domains
dataset, more than 11% of plain-domains provide a different cer-
tificate fingerprint than their equivalent www-domains. Over 10%
of plain-domains provide a different SKI than their equivalent
www-domains. Over 3.4% select a different version or cipher-
suite than their equivalent www-domains. On the other hand, the
random-domains dataset shows lower percentages of differences
(see Table 2).
5.3 When “www.” Means Better TLS Security
For further analysis, we compare plain-domains and their equiva-
lent www-domains against several defined weakness indicators
denoted by weak (see section 4.3 for further details about the
methodology). In this section, we limit our analysis to TLS 1.3
client handshake results as TLS 1.3 handshake is more representa-
tive of an updated TLS client today, such as web browsers (recall
that in our TLS scan experiments, we perform two types of hand-
shakes for each domain, one utilising TLS 1.3 configurations, and
the second utilising TLS 1.2 configurations). As shown in Table 3,
it is always the case that there are fewer www-domains that satisfy
weakness indicators compared to plain-domains that do so (see Ta-
ble 3, under the “Type/Condition” column, compare the results of
row “weakplain” to those of “weakwww” in each dataset). Also, it
is always the case that the number of plain-domains that satisfy a
weakness indicator while their equivalent www-domains do not, is
higher than the number of www-domains that satisfy a weakness
indicator while their equivalent plain-domains do not (see Ta-
ble 3, under the “Type/Condition” column, compare the results of
row “weakplain∧¬weakwww” to those of “weakwww∧¬weakplain”
in each dataset). For example, as depicted in Table 3, in the
top-domains dataset, of the 3.62% plain-domains that provide
expired certificates, there are 10.24% that provide non-expired
certificates by their equivalent www-domains. However, in the
same dataset (top-domains), of the 3.42% www-domains that
provide expired certificates, there are only 5.18% that provide
non-expired certificates by their equivalent plain-domains. The
same trend appears in all of the weakness indicators we study (see
Table 3), which suggests that www-domains tend to have better
TLS security configurations and certificates than their equivalent
plain-domains.
5.4 Relationship to HTTPS Redirection
To better understand the reasons behind the observed phenomenon,
we analyse the HTTPS redirection behaviour of those domains.
We input 678,214 top domains and 612,839 random domains
that have provided responses for both plain-domains and their
equivalent www-domains in the TLS 1.3 latest scan experiment.
As depicted in Table 4, from the top-domains dataset, 97.55%
of plain-domains and 97.68% of www-domains responded to our
redirection scan. From the random-domains dataset, 95.92% of
plain-domains, and 96.01% of www-domains have responded to
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Table 4: Summary of the HTTPS redirection scan results.
Dataset Size Type Responses Redirection
top-domains 678,214
plain 661,596 (97.55%) 225,839 (34.14%)
www 662,474 (97.68%) 155,921 (23.54%)
random-domains 612,839
plain 587,850 (95.92%) 78,449 (13.35%)
www 588,380 (96.01%) 59,611 (10.13%)
our redirection scan. Of the responding domains to our redi-
rection scan, in the top-domains dataset, 34.14% of HTTPS
plain-domains redirected to (i.e. land on) their equivalent HTTPS
www-domains, while 23.54% of HTTPS www-domains redirected
to their equivalent HTTPS plain-domains. In the random-domains
dataset, 13.35% of HTTPS plain-domains redirected to their
equivalent HTTPS www-domains, while 10.13% of HTTPS www-
domains redirected to their equivalent HTTPS plain-domains.
From these results, we conclude that plain-domains tend to redi-
rect to their equivalent www-domains more than www-domains
that redirect to their equivalent plain-domains, and HTTPS redi-
rection from plain-domains to their equivalent www-domains is
more utilised in top-domains than in random-domains.
We conduct further analysis on the set of domains that showed
at least one weakness indicator in plain-domains, but not in their
equivalent www-domains in the TLS scan (see Table 3, domains
in row “weakplain ∧¬weakwww” in both datasets). In the top-
domains dataset, out of 11,893 top domains that fall into this
set and responded to our plain-domains redirection scan, 6345
(53.35%) HTTPS plain-domains redirected to (land on) their equiv-
alent HTTPS www-domains. Of those, 1568 (24.71%) have one
or more HTTP (plain-text, unencrypted and unauthenticated) inter-
mediate URLs in the redirection chain. In the random-domains
dataset, out of the 3369 random domains that fall into that set and
responded to our redirection scan, 664 (19.71%) HTTPS plain-
domains redirected to their equivalent HTTPS www-domains. Of
those, there are 252 (37.95%) HTTP intermediate URLs. The
redirection from HTTPS plain-domains to HTTPS www-domains
in these domains that show one or more weakness indicators
in plain-domains, but not in www-domains, is higher than the
overall redirection rate that is presented in Table 4 earlier. Ap-
parently, in this set of domains, domain administrators pay more
attention to www-domains security as HTTPS plain-domains are
redirected to their equivalent HTTPS www-domains. However,
secure redirection should maintain secure TLS configurations and
certificates at every point in the redirection chain.
6 Related Work
Chang et al. [9] conducted a study that assessed the HTTPS
redirection in top domains. They found that the majority (83.3%)
of HTTPS redirections are not secure. They examine applica-
tion level properties such as the Strict-Transport-Security
(HSTS) policy adoption. Our work looks at the problem from
a different layer. That is, we consider transport layer security
configurations and certificates, which have not been considered
previously. Wählisch et al. [28] noticed differences in the IP
address prefixes between plain-domains and www-domains as
part of their empirical analysis of the Resource Public Key In-
frastructure (RPKI) deployment on the Alexa list of the top one
million domains. They pointed out that the differences in the top
100K domains are higher than those in the rest of the domains.
Our work examines two different datasets, top-domains, and
random-domains. Additionally, it compares the TLS configura-
tions and certificates, which have not been explored in previous
work. Finally, there are several studies that evaluate the crypto-
graphic strengths of TLS servers such as Lee et al. [17], Holz et
al. [13], Alashwali [2], and more recently, Alashwali et al. [3],
Calzavara et al. [8], and Kotzias et al. [16]. However, none of
them have attempted to compare the TLS configurations when
connecting to plain-domains and their equivalent www-domains.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the results of an experiment that
aims to explore whether plain-domains and their equivalent www-
domains differ in TLS security configurations and certificates? and
if so, to what extent? Our results inform the Internet measurement-
based research community, domains (servers) administrators, de-
velopers, and users alike. First, we provided evidence that there
is a difference between plain-domains and their equivalent www-
domains in terms of TLS security configurations and certificates
in a non-trivial number of cases. The difference is more notable in
top domains than in random domains. Second, by defining some
weakness indicators and examining when plain-domains and their
equivalent www-domains satisfy these indicators, we showed that
www-domains tend to have better TLS security than their equiv-
alent plain-domains. Third, we showed that HTTPS redirection
from plain-domains to their equivalent www-domains is widely
utilised, especially in the top domains, and more significantly
in the set of domains that show one or more weakness indica-
tor in plain-domains but not in their equivalent www-domains
(weakplain ∧¬weakwww). In the latter case, users see the final
www-domains (URL) with strong TLS security configurations
and certificates, but in fact, the HTTPS request has actually
passed through plain-domains which have less secure TLS con-
figurations and certificates at previous points in the redirection
chain. Even worse, many intermediate URLs in these redirection
chains are plain-text HTTP. This introduces a weak link in the
system, which may be dangerous for users.
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